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ABSTRACT The paper considers the effects of economic globalization on the 
relationship between national economic and political elites. It is contended that 
high levels of globalization lead to the de-coupling of economic elites from national 
political elites and that economic globalization also marginalizes the powers of 
dependent nation states. The thesis of this paper is that in economically globalized 
states there is a duality of power.  A political elite is legitimated electorally to a 
national constituency but excluded from the nexus of power by globalized processes. 
The composition and balance between ruling elites diverge between nation states. 
A comparison is made between the British and Russian economic elites.  The paper 
considers the composition of the boards of directors of twelve leading companies in 
the UK and fourteen in Russia. Attention is given to their national and educational 
background as well as their current or previous links with governments and economic 
institutions. On the basis of the biographies of directors and other company data, it 
is concluded that the economic elites in British companies are global in composition 
and decoupled from the UK’s political elites.  Globalization moves capitalism out 
of a nation state framework and neo-liberalism legitimates markets over states. 
Such de-coupling leads to increasing political weakness of national political elites 
and stimulates movements for economic nationalism. Russia is considered a hybrid 
system with many leading companies being closely integrated with the political 
elite but others are more autonomous and multinational in control and ownership. 
The economic structure is the basis of Russia’s economic nationalism.  Political 
leadership is considered a key variable in tipping the balance. 
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Political elites provide many necessary and useful functions: they respond 
to political events, they have transformative capacities through leadership 
and persuasion. They exercise political management, articulate and aggregate 
interests, and concoct legitimating ideologies. Dominant ruling elites also 
exclude and suppress contesting views and interests.  But political elites respond 
to and their influence is dependent on other constituencies. Political elites are 
linked to structures of economic, ideological and military power. The ways such 
structures interact with national political elites to shape economic policy is a 
crucial component in promoting or undermining consensus and stability. The 
political dimension is dependent on social structural variables such as national 
and transnational corporations.
The current dominant elite paradigm may be criticised on two counts. First: 
it de-couples the analysis of ruling elites from social and economic structures. 
Ruling elites are part of, or dependent on, the support of interests which control 
strategic sectors and resources in society. Second: academic analysis focuses on 
national elites, rather than on the interaction between national and globalizing 
elites.  This is because in the evolution of democratic control of political power, 
the state has been the mechanism and institution in which political power is 
exercised. Traditional nationally-based political elites are increasingly losing 
influence as the borders of nation states become porous to globalizing interests. 
Neo-liberal globalization has shifted political and economic power away from 
national to regional and global elite networks. In response to neo-liberal ideology, 
dominant Western national leaders have sought to connect national economic and 
political elites to a global type of capitalism. In doing so, national elites have been 
severed from their domestic constituencies. 
Political power is exercised in three domains: national, regional, global. A crucial 
feature of electoral democracies is that they have political leaders and elites embedded 
in national social and economic structures. It is only in the national domain that 
states are the focus of electoral competition and political responsibility. The state is 
a crucial institution as it is the nexus through which democracy is legitimated and, 
if they are to be considered democratic, to which political elites are answerable. 
Discussion by writers working in the elite paradigm has traditionally framed elite 
behavior in terms of political linkages2 formed by national networks.  Neo-liberal 
globalization has changed the configuration of ruling elite interests to the regional 
and global.  Markets replace states as decision making bodies. 
2  Higley and J. Pakulski (2007: 7) point out that ‘in complex liberal democracies leaders are 
embedded in, and their effectiveness significantly depends upon, political elites: tiny groups of 
strategic position-holders with the organized capacity to affect political outcomes regularly and 
substantially’.
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The globalization of economic power is a consequence of changes in structural 
conditions affecting the powers of transnational corporations, national 
governments and international institutions.3 Such developments have weakened 
and marginalized national political elites. National political elites have become 
decoupled from national social and economic constituencies by articulating wider 
cosmopolitan interests.  Such cosmopolitan interests exert a non-territorial form 
of power through policies often predicated on the ideology of neo-liberalism. 
This process has occurred over the history of capitalism, but reached qualitatively 
higher levels associated with global neo-liberalism since the fourth quarter of the 
20th century. However, globalization has unequal effects on states. The composition 
and power of ruling national elites have different patterns. Some elites may be 
more integrated into, are more dependent on, and more responsive to global than 
national constituencies. In these circumstances national elites become decoupled 
from their own constituents. 
Governing political elites are in an ambiguous position.  Their power is 
legitimated by public vote or promotion of the public good which is defined 
within the contours of state politics and political leadership is legitimated by 
a state based electoral processes. ‘Democratic political elites’ are responsible 
to the public, to the electorate. But their power and influence are dependent on 
linkages (for finance, sponsorship, knowledge, and endorsement) to economic, 
political and social constituencies which are increasingly transnational. In this 
context, the material or ideal interests which shape the motivations and political 
activities of elites and political leaders may displace the legitimate reference 
groups of ruling political elites.  Political elites become detached from their 
electoral political constituencies. 
The thesis of this paper is that there is a duality of power.  A political elite is 
legitimated electorally to a national constituency but excluded from the nexus of 
power by globalized processes (i.e. processes which occur independently of state 
borders). The question that I address is how globalized capitalism impinges on 
different states and thus shapes the contours of political opportunity. I consider the 
relationship between the level of globalization and economic elite structure. It is 
intended to serve as an empirical example of the ways in which economic elites are 
fragmented by globalization and how economic nationalism may be a response.  The 
3  Examples are the US Organisation for International Investment, the European-American Business 
Council, the Global Association of Financial Institutes, the Institute of International Bankers, 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue, International Business Investment Network, The International 
Chamber of Commerce, the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Conferences, The World Economic 
Forum, the International Chamber of Commerce and The World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development. These act in addition to well know organisations such as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation.
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extent and type of incorporation of countries into the world order of interdependent 
states varies greatly. In this paper, I consider only the economic aspects and restrict 
discussion mainly to two polar examples: the UK and the Russian Federation. 
VARIATIONS IN THE LEVEL OF GLOBALIZATION
Developments since the last quarter of the 20th century have involved a 
significant de-territorialisation of national capitalisms. But the significance of 
such changes is open to question.  Kenichi Ohmae, Colin Crouch and Leslie 
Sklair, on the one side, consider the state to be compromised in the face of the 
power of international and global companies (Ohmae: 1995, Crouch:2010, Sklair 
2002). Under such conditions, political elites based on the nation   state are 
severely constrained as political power becomes internationalised in scope. The 
global economic market undermines not only political democracy which operates 
at a state level, but also gives rise to national political elites who are dependent on 
international interests (institutions like the IMF and global corporations).  Other 
commentators, like Peter Dicken (2003) and Michael Mann (2013), contend that 
the state retains significant powers.
Much of the confusion is derived from considering global capitalism as a 
unitary world-system, rather than as a collection of states and regions having 
different economic structures and historical trajectories. The world system is 
made up of many states and regions and not all are equally subject to global 
corporations and to neo-liberalism.  The vehicle of globalized capitalism is the 
transnational corporation4.  
Economic globalization has two dimensions. First, parent companies ‘colonize’ 
domestic companies through take-overs then create wealth in the form of investment 
and employment in the host countries while returning home profits. This is the basis 
of dependency for host countries – they have no jurisdiction over foreign parent 
companies. The significance here is that such asset transfers to host countries 
4  Transnational corporations (TNCs) are constituted of parent enterprises and foreign affiliates.  A 
formal definition of a transnational corporation (TNC) is that it is ‘an incorporated or unincorporated 
enterprise comprising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates. A parent enterprise is defined as 
an enterprise that controls assets of other entities in countries other than its home country, usually 
by owning a certain equity capital stake’. A foreign affiliate is an incorporated or unincorporated 
enterprise in which an investor, who is a resident in another economy, owns a stake that permits 
a lasting interest in the management of that enterprise (an equity stake of 10 per cent for an 
incorporated enterprise, or its equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise). In World Investment 
Report (WIR), subsidiary enterprises, associate enterprises and branches are all referred to as 
foreign affiliates or affiliates. (WIR 2005: 297). 
225
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
THE DE-COUPLING OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC ELITES FROM POLITICAL ELITES
‘involve a shift in production control and management from domestic to foreign 
firms. . .’ (WIR 2009: 9) It also affects the ways in which national governments 
are able to manage their economies.  Secondly, new parent companies in the host 
country develop their own regional and global pretensions which give rise to neo-
liberal globalizing interests.  The problem which arises for governments in both 
parent and host countries is how to exercise their control. This applies to their own 
globalizing companies when their global interest (for profit, for expansion) does 
not coincide with the home government’s policies (say for employment and social 
development).  Political elites become ‘cut off’ from those with economic power. 
This disjunction is one of the reasons for the rise of populist parties.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the crucial link giving the transnational 
corporation a multinational character.  FDI grew exponentially between 1982 and 
2006. Figure 1 shows the growth of FDI outflows, cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions and the consequent rise in assets of foreign affiliates of transnational 
companies. The growth of foreign affiliates and their contribution to company 
sales were also of great significance. 
Figure 1.  Indicators FDI outflows, cross-border acquisitions an total assets of foreign 
affiliates:  1982-2006
Key FDIoutflow FDI outflows  
 CrB Mas Cross-border Mergers and acquisitions
   AsForAfs                Total assets of foreign affiliates 
Values at current prices (billions of dollars).
FDI outflows and Cross border mergers.
Left hand axis – Billions dollars. 
Right hand axis (billions dollars) – Total assets of foreign affiliates
Source Unctad, World Investment Report (WIR) 2007, p.9
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The results of this economic colonization is shown in Table 1 which shows the 
number of parent corporations as well as the foreign affiliates in different states 
and groups of states. It brings out the disparities between the numbers of parent 
companies and affiliates in different countries. The European countries, Japan and 
China house transnational parent companies.  The USA and the UK have large 
numbers of parent companies and both host foreign affiliates – though the USA 
(with a far larger economy) has far less affiliates on its shores than the UK. Japan 
hosts fewer affiliates than its parent companies.  China and the New Member States 
of the European Union host literally thousands of foreign companies. The New 
Member States of the EU, with a much lower population, have ten times more 
TNC affiliates than the CIS5. These differences have significant implications for 
the class and elite structure. 
Table 1: Parent Corporations and Foreign Affiliates of Transnational Companies: 
South America, CIS and New Member States, East Asia, China, USA and UK (2010)
 Parent  Foreign
 Corporations Affiliates
NMS 3 063 130430
CIS  176 3 487
USA 9692 27251
UK 7398 45466
Japan 4543 2948
South 
America 807 10349
East Asia 20955 450589
Of which 
China 12000 434248
Located in the areas shown. Some cases include counts of establishments.
Source: WIR Web table 34. Accessed 18 April 2017
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, the UK has had significant 
international trade and British companies and British share holders had vast 
investments abroad, particularly in the colonies.  From the late twentieth century, 
however, the pattern of ownership began to change. British companies were 
purchased by foreigners and cross border mergers and acquisitions strengthened 
transnational corporations. As shown in Fig 2, the UK, while retaining a large 
number of parent companies, also hosts an even larger number of affiliates.
5  In these tables ‘CIS’ refers to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. MNS are 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia. Slovenia, 
Romania
227
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
THE DE-COUPLING OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC ELITES FROM POLITICAL ELITES
The low penetration of Russia and other CIS states by multinational corporations 
measures their lack of exposure to economic globalization.  By 2010, only 116 
parent corporations and 2139 affiliates were based in the Russian economy.  Russia 
was (and is) one of the least economically globalized industrialised countries. As 
we see from the comparisons shown in Figure 2, Hungary, typically of the New 
Member States of the EU was heavily penetrated by transnational companies. 
Figure 2.  Number of parent corporations and foreign affiliates in USA, UK, Hungary, 
Brazil, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus (2010)
Number of parent companies in the economy shown. Right hand axis.
Number of foreign affiliates in the economy shown. Left hand axis.
Source: For 2010, WTO UNCTAD, Webtable 34. unctad.org.wir. (Annex tables). Accessed 18 
May 2017.  Some entries refer to earlier years. For earlier data see: World Investment Report 2007. 
UNCTAD, United Nations, New York, Geneva 2007. pp. 217-218. 
These developments have significantly impacted on national politics. The 
structure and composition of economic and political elites vary between 
countries – depending on the extent to which their companies and industries 
have become de-territorialized. A major contention of writers following Crouch 
and Sklair is that in globalizing societies, national political elites become detached 
from their domestic constituencies and consequently lack effectiveness. This 
reasoning would apply to the post-socialist New Member States which have been 
fully incorporated into the world order. Their political power no longer resides 
in the nation state: their political elites have little power over the allocation of 
economic resources, they have none over tariffs.  
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However, the countries of the former USSR have remained more peripheral 
or in contention with the hegemonic economic states. The Russian Federation 
moved into a globalizing mode in the early years following the breakup of the 
USSR and foundations were laid for a number of Russian based international 
energy companies. Inward FDI facilitated the entry of foreign based global 
firms. However exposure of Russia to the world market led to internal decay and 
international weakness which, to some extent, have been halted under President 
Putin. An implication here is that the Russian national political elite structure 
is far less de-coupled from the Russian economy than in other more globalized 
states. My hypotheses is that ruling elites in Russia have to be more responsive to 
domestic constituencies and less to globalizing ones. They are less constrained by 
external interests. Economic nationalism is built into Russian politics. Study of the 
composition of company boards will explore these linkages. 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE BOARDS  
OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
The rise and geographical distribution of transnational corporations have 
been outlined above. What then is the significance of the economic globalization 
process for the structure and legitimacy of the political elites? How do they 
relate to the interests of global companies? Many academics and political pundits 
have complained about ‘stateless elites whose allegiance is to global economic 
success and their own prosperity rather than the interests of the nation state 
where they are headquartered’ (Summers 2008). The literature provides little 
empirical backing for such generalizations to show the de-coupling of national 
economic elites from the political elite structure.  
The growing presence of foreign interests may be evaluated by a study of 
the composition of boards of directors of major companies. The assumption 
underlying this study is not that eponymous directors are by definition more 
altruistic than foreigners – some are capable of plundering their companies like 
anyone else. Rather the significance is that when deterritorialization occurs, 
the socialization process breaks national links between the economic elite 
and the country in which the parent company is embedded.  Companies have 
responsibilities to other stake holders and to the community, but ‘the community’ 
for transnational companies is not defined.  It might be hypothesized that a 
multinational board is more conducive to a neo-liberal global policy than a 
national one, as its responsibility would be clearly to satisfy the interests of 
shareholders.  Decisions about the location and amount of investment (and 
reinvestment), outsourcing, levels of employment, staff pensions and training can 
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be influenced by the social and national composition of boards.  Family owned 
firms have been shown to have a stronger inclination to maintain production in 
the home country and to enhance levels of domestic productivity rather than 
moving to cheap labor sites.  For multinationals with no domestic community 
commitments, neo-liberal objectives of efficiency and profitability overcome any 
wider national, political or social aspects of company policy. A multinational 
board is likely to regard the shareholders as the major reference group and the 
scope of decision making is the wider global economy.  Domestically recruited 
boards are more likely to pursue a policy of economic nationalism. 
Study of the composition of company boards will show whether there remains 
any significant overlap between board members and the political elites of the 
parent (or any other) country. The objective is to record the source of recruitment, 
the social composition and national identity of the corporate elite, noting any 
overlap between political and economic elites. Such details also indicate the type 
of socialization the members have experienced. Board members with economic 
and political overlap are able to maintain a two-way exchange. National 
governments can have direct influence on the boards and vice versa.
The boards of 42 important TNCs were surveyed by UNCTAD in 2004. It 
was found that the percentage of non-home national directors was 33 per cent 
for EU companies and 18 per cent for US based corporations. Germany retained 
a significant national composition, with only 8 per cent of board members 
being non-nationals, whereas for UK based multinationals, out of a total of 102 
directors 53 of the boards were foreign born with some 20 per cent coming from 
the EU and the same proportion from the USA. Total USA participation in EU 
companies was only 11 per cent (including those in UK companies). For Japan, 
as one might expect, out of a total of 123 directors, only 3 were foreign. The UK 
had the highest saturation of non-UK directors6.  
The data cited by UNCTAD refer to the early twenty-first century and also 
ignore rising states with newly constituted companies such as Russia and 
China. To detail more precisely elite personal linkages between companies and 
government, I consider the composition of transnational company boards in two 
countries: the UK and the Russian Federation. These are examples of highly 
and less globalized economies with companies selected from the Top 2000 
Transnational Companies as constituted in the Forbes List. The members of the 
boards are then described from the biographies of directors as published in the 
company annual reports.
6 Annex Table A.I.28. UNCTAD 2004. p.38. 
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The Boards of British Companies
The Forbes list of 2000 global companies ranks companies by an average of their 
profits, assets and market value7.  I have selected from this list twelve companies 
from different economic sectors.  Shell (rank 11), BP (rank 17), Vodafone 
Group Plc (38), Rio Tinto (109), GlaxoSmithKline (116) National Grid (168), 
AstraZeneca (183),  HSBC Holdings (14), Barclays (161), Aviva (143), Royal 
Bank of Scotland (425) and Lloyds Bank (391). Comprehensive details (market 
value, sales, profits, assets) on these companies for 2014 or later are given in 
Appendix 1. 
Shell plc is an icon of the multinational corporation. Until 2005 it was a dual 
UK/Dutch company, since then it is a single company with its headquarters 
in Holland but registered in London. In 2015 it was ranked in the World 
Investment Report as the top world company by its ownership of foreign assets. 
It operates in 70 countries and in 2016 had revenue of 236.6 billion dollars8. 
It has a single-tier Board of Directors with 12 members9. The Board has five 
American nationals, four Dutchmen, two British and one Asian member. Study 
of their work backgrounds shows that most had work experience in the USA 
(seven members) followed by Europe (five, including only one in the UK), three 
had worked in Asia. Four had participated in government (two in Holland) in 
some capacity and three had been on advisory boards or acted in an advisory 
capacity; one had been a British ambassador in the USA. Only four had or have 
directorships in other companies. The directors had experience of government, 
in both Holland and the USA. Apart from the British former ambassador only 
one other member of the board was British. American work background appears 
to dominate the Board.  
The detailed biographies of three Board members are cited here to give the 
reader an account of the linkages between different companies and politics. 
Charles O. Holliday, a US national was appointed Chairman in May 2015, 
having been a non-executive director since 2010. He previously worked in the 
USA from 1970 when he joined DuPont after graduating in engineering from 
the University of Tennessee. He has worked in Tokyo as President of DuPont 
Asia/Pacific. His previous jobs include Chairman of the Bank of America, 
he have served on the Business Council, Catalyst, the National Academy of 
7  Forbes Top 2000 global companies available at: http://www.forbes.com/global2000. (Various 
dates). The Rankings here are taken from the 2014 list. 
8 Shell plc Financial Statement 2016. 
9  Data on directors taken from Shell website available at http://www.shell.com/about-us/leadership/
board-of-directors.html   accessed 21 April 2017.
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Engineering, the Society of Chemical Industry, the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development and Director of Deere International. He is a director 
of HCA Holdings. 
Hans Wijers is deputy Chairman, and a Dutch national educated in economics 
at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He has been a non-executive directory of 
Shell from 2009. He has been CEO and Chairman of the Board of Management 
of AkzoNobel N.V. from 2003 to 2012. Other posts include: Senior Partner at 
The Boston Consulting Group. He was Minister of Economic Affairs of the 
Netherlands from 1994 to 1998. He has been Chairman of the Supervisory 
Board of AFC Ajax N.V. and 2013 to 2016 he was a Non-executive Director of 
GlaxoSmithKline plc.  He also Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Heineken 
N.V., a member of the Supervisory Board of HAL Holding N.V. and a trustee of 
various charities.
Sir Nigel Sheinwald GCMG is a British national, having been appointed a Non-
executive Director of Shell in July 2012. He is a former British diplomat having 
joined the Diplomatic Service in 1976 and served in Brussels, Washington, 
Moscow and in a wide range of policy roles in London. He was British 
Ambassador to the USA from 2007 to 2012. Prior to this, he served as Foreign 
Policy and Defence Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the Cabinet 
Office Defence and Overseas Secretariat. He served as British Ambassador 
and Permanent Representative to the European Union in Brussels from 2000 
to 2003. He is a Non-executive Director of Invesco Limited and Raytheon UK, 
a Senior Adviser to the Universal Music Group and a Visiting Professor and 
Council Member of King’s College, London. 
GlaxoSmithKline in 2016 had a market value of 104.2 billion dollars, sales of 
36.6 billion, profits of 12.9 billion and assets worth 78.8 billion. The company 
operates in over 115 countries – its largest market is the USA. and has a very 
large research and development operation.  The Board of Directors has 11 
members, composed mainly of British people (probably 7) with an Indian and a 
Swiss member.  Only 23 joint Board memberships are listed. A distinguishing 
factor is the large number of members who have had an academic career or a 
research background.   (Detail of the biographies on the company web site is 
very brief).  The Chairman, Sir Philip Hampton is a business administrator. 
He is described on the company web site as:  having ‘chaired major FTSE 100 
companies, including The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc and J Sainsbury 
plc. He has also served as Group Finance Director at Lloyds TSB Group, 
BT Group plc, BG Group plc, British Gas plc and British Steel plc. [He] was 
previously appointed an Executive Director of Lazards and a Non-Executive 
Director at RMC Group Plc and Belgacom SA. Until 2009, he was Chairman 
of UK Financial Investments Limited, which manages the UK Government’s 
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shareholdings in banks’.  One of its directors, Vivien Cox is said on the Glaxo 
website to have ‘a deep understanding of regulatory and government relations’. 
Not one director is credited with any current or previous government post. 
National Grid in 2016 had revenues of 24.2 billion dollars. National grid 
delivers energy to consumers in the UK and in parts of the USA.10  The Annual 
Report divulges very little information about the background of board members. 
There are 6 British members, 5 Americans and a Canadian. Nearly all have or 
had experience on the boards of other companies. Nicola Shaw ‘has a broad 
range of experience and strong track-record working with the UK Government, 
the European Commission and Parliament, with Regulators and in leading 
important infrastructure businesses.’ Quite exceptional is the presence of a 
former Members of Parliament, Ruth Kelly, who served in the Labor government 
under Tony Blair. She held positions of Minister for the Cabinet Office and also 
Minister of State for Education and Skills. 
AstraZeneca in 2016 made sales of $24.2 billion. (Annual Report 2016) It 
is a British–Swedish multinational pharmaceutical company. It has grown by 
buying and amalgamating companies and retains research sites and offices in 
many countries including the United States, China, Brazil and Japan11. China is 
the company’s second largest market. The Company gives very little information 
on the background of its board. Of the board members only one (possibly two) 
is British. There are two with Swedish and two with French nationality, one 
Dutchman and one Chinese; three are likely to be Americans. There are no 
recoded links with government. The non-executive chairman is a member of the 
European Round Table of Industrialists.
BP Global in 2016 operated in 74 countries and had an operating cash flow 
of $17.6 million12. It is a conglomerate which has amalgamated British and 
American firms. It includes the original British Petroleum, Standard Oil (USA), 
Amoco, ARCO, Burmah Castrol; it also has a 20 pr cent stake in Russia’s 
Rosneft which displaced its earlier partnership with TNK (which lasted until 
2013).  The USA is its largest division. 
In 2016, it had a Board of Directors with 12 members, its Chairman, Carl-Henric 
Svanberg, is Swedish. The chief executive, Bob Dudley, has dual citizenship 
with UK and USA.   Its Board of Directors includes 6 Americans and 8 English 
10  For details see its website:  http://www2.nationalgrid.com/about-us/our-history. Accessed 23 
April 2017.
11  For details of Board see: https://www.astrazeneca.com/our-company/leadership.html. Accessed 
24 April 2017
12  See Annual report available at: http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/investors/
bp-annual-report-and-form-20f-2016.pdf. Viewed 21 April 2017.
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citizens (though the latter include two with joint citizenship). Study of work 
histories in their autobiographies reveals that there were 22 work placements 
(outside BP) in foreign countries compared to 7 in UK. Board members reach 
out to other firms and 30 directorships were reported.  Five board members had 
direct links with politics.  These however were in an administrative or advisory 
capacity. None had been elected.  Work experience was in the USA though 
importantly some of the Board had experience in areas of BP production, notably 
Russia. Unlike Shell which has on its Board people who have held government 
executive positions. BP recruits people from previous elite positions: a US navy 
admiral and an ex chief of the British secret services among others. 
Vodafone Group Plc has branches in 26 countries and has partner networks 
in over 50 additional countries. In 2016 it had revenue of £40.973 billion. It has 
absorbed many other smaller companies but in 2013 it divested for $130 billion 
its share in the ownership of Verizon which has led to its current absence in the 
US market.  
There were 14 directors on the Board in 201413.  The majority were British – 
just half- in addition there were 2 Americans and 4 Europeans (Dutch, Italian, 
French and Belgian) and 1 Ghanaian. In all they held a total of 51 directorships 
in other companies.  The most notable characteristic of the board was the 
hiring of people with experience from other companies. The chairman, Gerard 
Kleisterlee President/chief executive of Philips where he had worked for 30 
years. Stephen Pusey had worked for Nortel Networks for 23 years and had 
been its Executive Vice-President and President. Nick Land had worked for 
Ernst and Young for 36 years and had been its chairman for 11 years. Luc 
Vandevelde had been CEO and chairman of Carrefour as well as Chairman of 
Marks and Spencer. 
The directors had relatively little involvement in politics and none in UK 
politics. Vittorio Cotao, had been on the steering committee of the European 
Round Table of Industrialists. Valerie Gooding had been a board member of 
Confederation of British Industry. Of particular note is that Samuel Jonah had 
been an advisor to the President of Ghana and South Africa, on the advisory 
council and a member of the President of the African Development Bank. He has 
also been an advisor to the Presidents of Togo and Nigeria. Anne Lauvergeon 
had served as deputy chief of staff to the French Presidency and had been an 
advisor for Economic international affairs. None had any recorded position in 
British politics. 
13  Vodafone Group, Annual Report 2014. Available at: https://www.vodafone.com/content/
annualreport/annual_report14/downloads/our_board_and_group_management. Accessed 22 May 
2017
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The directors’ profile is one of technical executives working in engineering 
extraction companies in many parts of the world (including Canada, the USA, 
Chile, Argentina, Netherlands, China, South East Asia. India and South Africa). 
Four have had some participation in politics.  Sam Laidlaw from the UK had 
been a member of the UK Prime Minister’s Business Advisory Group and had 
been a senior director at the UK Department of Transport.  Anne Lauvergeon 
had been adviser for economic international affairs under the French President 
(as noted earlier).  Michael L’Etrange, an Australian had been an adviser to 
the Australian Prime Minister and Cabinet and had served as Australia’s High 
Commissioner to the UK before being appointed as secretary of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Paul Tellier had been a clerk of the Privy Council 
Office and secretary to the Cabinet of the government of Canada; he had also 
chaired a Prime Minister’s Advisory committee.  None had held an elected 
political role. 
Boards in the British Financial Sector
The financial sector is a major player in the UK economy. In 2010, it accounted 
for 10 per cent of UK GDP and 11 per cent of tax receipts, it made a trade surplus 
of £35.1 billion, greater than all other exporting industries (pharmaceuticals 
made £7 billion). But British ‘home’ banks are not major players in the 
international economy14. 
In 2012, the UK financial sector was dominated by five banks plus Lloyds 
and Santander (registered in Spain). The five top banks had between them 1479 
affiliates located in from 19 to 65 countries. (See Table 2). Below I outline the 
background of the boards of directors of HSBC, Aviva, Barclays, the Royal 
Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Bank.
14  Most of the major investment banks are American, the top banks are: Bank of America, Barclays 
Capital, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank (with considerable presence in 
UK), Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Nomura Securities, UBS, Wells Fargo 
Securities.
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Table 2. British Financial Companies in Top 50 by Geographical Spread 2012  
(Millions of dollars and number of employees)15
Rank Assets Employees Foreign affiliates Host countries
2012                                                                    Affiliates (N)           Countries (N)
5    HSBC Holdings  2692538 288316  746 65
28  Aviva    513152.4   36562  238 28
29  Prudential    504316.1     25414  171 26
41  Old Mutual   233254.3   55549    99 19
45  Barclays  2422516 141100  225 46
      Total   1479 =
Source: data for 2012, UNCTAD.wir.Webtable 30. Accessed 26 Apr. 2017
HSBC Holdings plc, founded and registered in London in 1991, is a Chinese 
bank (The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) which acquired the 
indigenous UK Midland Bank.  It is the largest bank in Hong Kong, and the 
largest international bank in the Chinese People’s Republic. 
Study of the UK Board’s membership for 201616, confirms its international 
composition. Of its twenty members 7 are American, 8 British as well as 
nationals of Germany, Holland, Australia, and France, there is one Asian 
(country of origin not recorded). Of the incomplete educational records, 8 have 
been educated in the USA, 6 in the UK, 1 in Holland, 2 in France and 1 in 
Germany. 
Barclays plc is a long standing British bank with a foundation in London going 
back to the 17th century. The Bank bought up many other financial interests 
including Wells Fargo (USA), banks in South Africa, Woolwich Building 
society (UK), Juniper Bank (USA), Absa (S. Africa), and Expobank (Russia), 
Goldfish credit cards (USA) and parts of Lehman Bros.  Its board as constituted 
in 2016 had 14 members: 7 British, 5 American one French (or Swiss) and one 
Zambian. The chairman in 2016 was John McFarlane who has spent over 40 
years in the financial services sector. He is a Scot, educated at the University 
of Edinburgh. He has been chairman of Aviva, FirstGroup, and the Australian 
Bankers Association. He was CEO of Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group and also has been an executive director of Standard Chartered, and head 
of Citibank in the UK.
Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS Group) originated in the 18th century. 
It is an amalgamation of many banks – The Royal Bank of Scotland, National 
Westminster Bank; Williams & Glyn’s Bank, Ulster Bank; Drummonds; and 
15  World Investment Report 2016. Annex Table 24, World’s Top 100 Non-Financial Companies. 
www.unctad.org.wir. Accessed March 2017.
16 Data based on HSBC website: http://www.hsbc.com/about-hsbc/leadership. Accessed 25 April 2017
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Coutts & Co. Direct Line and Churchill Insurance. In the USA, it owns Citizens 
Financial Group, it is a major shareholder in the Bank of China. Following 
the financial crisis it was partly nationalised by the UK government which in 
2012 owns 84% of its shares. It made a loss of 13.4 billion dollars in 2014 (see 
Appendix I). There are fourteen people on its board in 201617: ten are British, 
one is French, one Canadian, one Australian and one New Zealander (nationality 
based on career path and education as not specifically defined in biographies). 
Its Chairman is Howard Davies who has been a Deputy Governor of the Bank 
of England and Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority. He was 
Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science from 2003 
until May 2011. 
The British Economic Elite: Some Conclusions
Study of the direct political links of the members of the Boards of the major 
UK financial companies finds very little direct overlap with the political elites. 
Very few have had experience as executives in state governments and even fewer 
as elected legislators. Some when in office have been appointed to government 
committees and working groups. Most members of the boards of financial 
companies are recruited from within the industry and a small number of board 
members have had administrative and executive positions in other businesses. 
The overwhelming picture is one of a relatively autonomous elite, of executives 
who have worked their way to the top in the banking and financial services’ 
sector. They appear to have had little time to devote to party politics. 
In UK based companies, the boards of the transnational companies are 
international in composition.  In most cases the majority of members are British, 
though all boards are multinational. Many reflect the process of mergers with 
foreign companies. Direct ties to their ‘home’ governments are weak. A very 
small number have had executive positions or acted on advisory bodies for short 
periods. In the financial sector, directors, shareholders and clients are global in 
character. 
The company boards of UKs major companies operate with little, if any, 
participation by the parliamentary political elite. The executive arm of 
government (the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and other Ministers) deals 
directly with global financial interests.  Many board members with previous 
membership of governmental bodies are useful to the company and bring 
17 For details see: http://www.rbs.com/about/board-and-governance/board-and-committees 
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insider knowledge and network links to their jobs. Elite interaction is part of an 
international rather than a national network.  
The move to multinational or transnational capitalism involves a shift away 
from national solidarity and a national political focus. As Jerry Harris (2006:93) 
puts it: globalization ‘eliminates economic nationalism as the basis for social 
inclusion’. Global elites have no single nation. They operate in the most profitable 
market. Their major objectives are to secure economic rents. Class interests 
shape the motivations and political activities of elites and political leaders. 
These linkages are often under-theorised by writers on elites (see discussion in 
Pakulski and Körösényi: 2011).
Bottomore suggests three different types of linkage between class and elite. They 
are: ‘complimentary concepts which refer to different types of political system or 
different aspects of the same political system.   We can attempt to distinguish 
[firstly] between  societies in which there is a ruling class, and at the same time 
elites which represent particular aspects of its interests;  [secondly], societies in 
which there is no ruling class, but a political elite which founds its power upon the 
control of the administration, or upon military force, rather than upon property 
ownership and inheritance;  and [thirdly], societies  in which there exists a 
multiplicity of elites among which no cohesion and enduring group of powerful 
individuals or families seem to be discoverable’ (Bottomore, 1964 (1982)).  
British economic elites do not fit easily into this categorization. The companies 
though registered in the UK have elites which are international in character. 
Ownership and inheritance do not appear as important social characteristics, 
though responsibility to shareholders is no doubt of importance. Judging by 
their biographies, they have a weak or non-existent national loyalty. They 
appear to be relatively autonomous in operation. They have only tenuous or 
indirect linkages to ruling political elites. I suggest a fourth category to add to 
Bottomore’s list which is nearest to his third category. A global economic elite, 
which is largely detached from national ruling elites, which operates in global 
space and is motivated to enlarge or make profits for economic corporations. 
COUPLING OF ECONOMIC ELITES TO THE 
POLITICAL IN RUSSIA
Following the de-statization and privatization achieved by the Yeltsin regime, a 
private property owning class, headed by oligarchs – strongly backed by Western 
international interests – became a major factor in the social structure. However, 
the propertied classes lacked legitimacy and were challenged by a renewal of 
an administrative elite under Putin. It seeks to contain both the national and 
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globalized bourgeoisie and it does this through economic nationalism. Trends 
towards globalization, favored by the West have been halted. 
Russian Transnational Companies
In 2013, Russia had 30 companies in Forbes list of 2000 global companies18. 
Seven of these are in oil and gas, ten are other primary sector producers, four 
are energy/electricity, three are retail (including Aeroflot), two are media and 
one (Sistema) is a conglomerate. The top company was Gazprom (ranked 17th 
in Forbes) followed by Rosneft (59), Sberbank (61) and Lukoil (64). Here we 
consider the composition of the boards of fourteen of the Russian companies in 
the Forbes’ list19.  (Rankings and financial data for 2014 (with slight variations 
from the 2013 list) are collected in Appendix II). Study of the composition of 
the boards of these companies gives significant insights into their divergence 
from Western ones. Unlike Western based transnationals, Russian companies 
provide a basis for a national capitalism. One may distinguish two trends: the 
major one being of home-based transnationals and the minor one, cosmopolitan 
based transnationals. The former have considerable state ownership and control.
Home-based Transnationals
Despite the attempts by Dmitry Medvedev in 2011 to reduce the representation 
of chinovniki on the boards of Russian companies, many Russian transnationals 
are heavily penetrated by directors who have (or had) significant positions in 
public administration. Russian transnationals are strongly linked to domestic 
politics. 
LUKOIL is the fourth largest Russian global company, in 2014 ranked 83rd  by 
Forbes. It is a vertically integrated company ranging from oil production and 
refining to petrochemicals and electricity generation. The company retails many 
of its products.  Unlike Gazprom, LUKOIL has significant private ownership. 
Vagit Alekperov owns 20.87 per cent of the shares (Annual Report 2012 p.99), 
18  Forbes Top 2000 global companies May 2013 available at: http://www.forbes.com/global2000. 
Accessed 2 January 2014
19  Gazprom, Sberbank, Rosneft, LUKOIL, TNK-BP (to 2013), VTB bank, NOMOS-BANK, Inter 
Rao, Aeroflot, Mechel, X5 Retail, Severstal, Rostelecom and Sistema.
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though other directors individually own less than 1 per cent.  Major owners 
are ING Bank (Eurasia) (75.94% on 1 January 2012), Depositary-clearing 
company 8.47 per cent, National depositary centre 5.52 per cent, SDK Garant 
3.93 % and OJSC URALSIB 1.42 per cent; Lukoil claims that it has more than 
50,000 individual and legal entities owning its shares. The discrepancy in 
the total number of shares (which sum to greater than 100) is due to the fact 
that directors’ holdings include shares directly owned and also held through 
beneficiaries. Pipelines and railroads used to transport the oil products are state 
owned companies; gas is transported by Gazprom which also sells LUKOIL gas 
production. In its Annual Report for 2012, very close links are shown between 
its Board members, the Russian government and other institutions. Of the twelve 
directors listed in the 2012 annual report eight are Russians and educated in 
Russia.  The company is a Russian one with global pretensions. It is noteworthy 
that the Annual Report lists the state honours bestowed on the directors thus 
emphasising their national identification. Its Chairman, Valery Grayfer is a Lenin 
(and others) Prize winner; Alekperov has two government prizes in science and 
technology; Igor Ivanov has received Russian (state) prizes; Ravil Maganov has 
received three orders and three medals; Sergei Mikhailov has four state medals. 
Alexander Shokhin has been awarded an honour for ‘Services to Russia’ and a 
medal of the Russian Security Council for ‘Services to National Security’. He is 
one of the directors to have had significant participation in Russian politics. He 
was Deputy Chairman of the government of the Russian Federation Minister of 
the Economy, Minister for Labor and Employment (1991-94). He was elected to 
three State Dumas of the Russian Federation and was Chairman of the Duma 
Fraction, ‘Our Home is Russia’. He has also been President of the Russian Union 
of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Sergei Mikhailov is a director of five other 
companies mainly in the banking sector.  There are also foreigners on the board. 
One director had served as director and CEO of international auditing KPMG; 
Richard Matzke is one of two Americans having previously been President of 
Chevron Corporation. Another American is Mark Mobius.  The one Italian is 
also a director of TREVI SpA, and the Canadian Oil Co.. A Swiss national, 
Ivan Pictet, is managing director of Pictet and Cie and President of the Geneva 
Chamber of Trade and Industry as well as being President of Geneve Place 
Financiere.
Gazprom20 is a global energy company ranked 21st in Forbes top 2000 
companies’ list. It produces gas and transports to European and world 
markets, it also produces electricity.  In 2012 the government of the Russian 
20  Data derived from Gazprom annual Report for 2012. www.gazprom.com Annual Report 2012. 
Data cited as of 31 December 2012. Accessed January 2014.
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Federation controlled 50.002 per cent of Gazprom’s shares. ‘The governmental 
representatives are the members of Gazprom’s Board of Directors whose powers 
include the approval of the financial plan and the investment program: in this 
way the government exercises the control over the financial flows of Gazprom’21. 
It has a strategy of expansion in South America, South-East Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East. All members of the Board are Russian and educated in Russia; 
in 2012 there were no foreign members. Most of the directors have prominent 
positions in the Russian government giving effective control of the company.   
Aeroflot is the successor of the Soviet national airline and is Russia’s largest 
airline. It is profitable and is majority owned by the Russian government. Of 
Aeroflot’s22  eleven elected members of the Board in 2011, all were Russians 
and all but one had been educated in Russia (the exception was educated in 
Kiev); two had followed post graduate courses -one in law and one in business 
studies in the USA.  They collectively held 16 directorships of other Russian 
companies, and only one directorship of a foreign company. Three had held 
government posts: in the Federal agency of state property, in the Ministry of 
Transport Directorate of structural reforms, one had been a deputy Minister of 
Economic Development, one a deputy head of the government of the Russian 
Federation Executive Office; and one was director of economic research at the 
Higher School of Economics.
Mechel is a coal, coke and steel company with many sites in Russia and plants 
in West Virginia, the UK, Lithuania, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Of its Board in 
201123, there were two foreign members (one American and one Englishman). 
The others were Russians educated in mining or economics in Russia. The two 
foreigners were directors of five foreign companies. Only one of the directors 
had a state office: Vladimir Gusev, who had been head of the Federal Tax 
Agency of Russia.
VTB bank is the former Vneshtorgbank (Foreign Trade bank)24 and is 263rd  in 
the Forbes 2000 list.  It is currently 75.5 per cent owned by the Russian Federation 
and none of its shareholders holds more than 1 per cent of its shares. It has fifteen 
subsidiaries in the CIS and worldwide. Expansion to the CIS and previous Soviet 
space is a ‘key priority’ of strategy (Annual report 2012). Its fifteen Supervisory 
Board members have only two foreign members: David Bonderman, the 
President of Texas Pacific Group Investment Fund who also holds directorships 
21 Gazprom annual Report 2012, p. 135.
22 Annual report for 2011 from website www.aeroflot-AR2011-final.
23 Annual report for 2012, Annual rep.pdf available at Mechel website. Accessed January 2014.
24  Data here is derived from annual report for 2012, accessed January 2014
 http://www.vtb.com/upload/iblock/87a/VTB_Annual_Report_2012_20130930_1635.pdf. 
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in Armstrong Worldwide Industries and Ryanair; and Mathias Warnig, managing 
director of Nord-Stream AG of Switzerland, and a director on the boards of Rusal, 
and Bank Rossiya, Rosneft and Gazprom Schweitz. He is a previous chairman 
of Dresdner Bank. Other Board members have strong links with other Russian 
banks and government institutions. Some of the board members are (or were) 
concurrently chinovniki holding positions in the government of the RF. Alexey 
Uvarov, for example is director of the Department of Industry and Infrastructure 
under the government of the RF, and was previously deputy head of Division of the 
Ministry of Property Relations of the RF.  Alexey Ulyukaev is deputy chairman 
of the Central Bank of the RF and holds the same position in Sberbank. He is 
also chairman of the Russian Direct Investment Trust. He has previously been 
first deputy Minister of Finance of the FR. He has been a member of Moscow 
City Duma.  Muhadin Eskindarov is principal of the Federal Institute of Higher 
Professional Education in the Financial University of the RF; he is on the board 
of TMK, the Moscow Industrial Bank, Bank Vozrozhdenie, and the Russian 
Agricultural Bank. As in other Russian companies, a significant proportion of 
the directors have higher degrees in economics and many have held positions in 
Russian higher educational institutions. With a leadership having overlapping 
membership of crucial government committees, experience in the state apparatus 
as well as participation in other state owned companies, the bank can be relied on 
to support a statist policy.
Sberbank is third in Forbes’s list of Russian top companies, being behind Rosneft 
in 58th place. Sberbank is majority owned by the Central Bank of Russia. It has 
a hundred million individual customers and one million business subscribers. 
In 2013 it had 17 directors: 6 representatives of the Central Bank of Russia, 2 
representatives from Sberbank, 1 external and 8 independent directors; they 
include two elected members of its management (Herman Gref Chairman and 
CEO, and Bella Zlatkis, Deputy Chairman)25. The independent and external 
directors include five academics Segei Guriev, Rector of the New Economic 
School; Vladimir Mau (Rector of the Russian Presidential Academy of National 
Economics and Public Administration); a representative from Rosneft. There was 
only one foreign adviser: Alessandro Profumo, Chairman of the Banca Monte 
Dei Paschi Di Siena, Italy.  The remaining members of the Board are Russians 
educated in Russia.   
NOMOS Bank is in the 1443rd place in the top 2000 companies. According 
to its Annual Report and Accounts26 for 2012, it is 49 per cent owned by the 
25  Data derived from: http://report-sberbank.ru/en/ar/bank-profile/bank-profile/. Accessed January 
2014
26 http://ir.nomos.ru. Accessed January 2014
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Russian ICT Group (Holding Company), the principal shareholder of which is 
Alexander Nesis. Deutsche Bank holds 21 per cent of its shares, followed by 
Otkritie Securities which owns 20 per cent. Otkritie is a Russian Financial group, 
the major shareholder of which is Vadim Belyaev, the President of Nomos Bank. 
There are two other individual shareholders, Alex Mamut (5 per cent) and Oleg 
Malis (5 per cent). All these men have joined the Russian bank from positions 
within the Russian Federation. There is no foreign representation, even though 
Deutsche Bank is a major shareholder.  Members of the board were all educated 
in Russia in non-elite higher educational institutions. 
Rostelecom is a Russian company, 55 per cent owned by the government 
through Svyazinvest. It is the largest telecom network over the Russian 
Federation. As listed in the Annual Report of 201227, of its fourteen directors 
13 are Russian and one is Armenian. All the directors were educated in Russia, 
economics being the most common subject; four had received post graduate 
education in business schools in the USA and one had studied languages in 
Germany. There were a total of 99 directorships in other Russian companies 
(during the past five years), mostly in telecommunications companies. There 
were 10 directorships (two of which were in Cyprus) in foreign companies. 
As to other positions held, one director had joint positions as professor of 
economics at two Russian Universities; one had been advisor to the Ministry of 
telecommunications and mass communications of the Russian Federation; other 
had been a Deputy Governor of the Krasnoyarsk region and deputy chairman 
of the Krasnoyarsk government. Igor Shchegolev had been a member of the 
Presidential administration (2002-2008) acting as chief of Protocol of the Russian 
president and had also been Minister of Telecom and Mass Communications 
2008-2012. 
Inter Rao UES’s business is in power generation and electricity supply. It also 
exports energy and has joint ventures with General Electric and Worley Parsons. 
As of February 26, 2014, its major owners are state entities such as Rosneftegaz 
(28 per cent) and Norilsk Nickel (12.3 per cent); minority shareholders own 
16.65 per cent. 
The biographies of retiring and new members of Inter Rao UES28 showed that 
only one director was of foreign origin (Ronald Pollett, President & CEO of GE 
in Russia and CIS).  Of the others all had been educated in Russia. Most had 
first degrees in science subjects and later studied economics or finance at post-
graduate level. Except for Pollett, none held directorships in companies outside 
27 Data from Annual Report for 2012. Rostelecom website. Accessed 15 January 2014
28  From annual report for 2012 AGM held on 25 June 2013. www.interrao.ru Accessed 14 Jan 2014. 
Data here based on all directors in post in 2012 and those elected in 2013.
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the CIS. (There were two directors who held positions in Latvia, Latvijas Gaze 
and Lithuania).  Most held multiple positions on the boards of other Russian 
companies – a total of 110 directorships between them. Two had held senior 
positions in the Russian government:  in Russian government: Oleg Budargin 
(Chairman of the Management Board, JSC  Federal Grid Company of Unified 
Energy System) had been governor of Tamyr Autonomous Okrug 2003-2007; 
Boris Kovalchuk, Chairman of the Management Board, JSC Inter Rao UES, 
had been head of the national priority projects – a department in the Russian 
Federation; he had also been an assistant to the First deputy Prime minister of the 
government of the Russian Federation.  Vladimir Strzhalkovsky had been CEO 
of the Federal agency for tourism, head of the commission intergovernmental 
commission for trade and economic collaboration with Indonesia, Greece, 
Spain, Bulgaria, Netherlands and Cyprus.  Igor Sechin, President and Chairman 
of the Management Board, Rosneft  had been a deputy prime minister in the 
Russian Federation and chief of staff of the presidential exec office and an aide 
to president of Russian Federation 2004-8. 
Rosneft is the second largest Russian company on Forbes list, ranking 34th 
in the top 2000 companies.  In the period 2007-2012, the Russian government 
owned 75.16 per cent of the shares of Rosneft through Rosneftegaz which was 
100 per cent state owned. (Individuals owned less than 1 per cent stakes of 
the shares)29. Rosneft purchased TNK-BP in 2013.  Of its nine board members, 
seven are Russians and educated in Russia; the remaining two are Swiss citizens 
one of whom, Hans-Joerg Rudloff, has been Chairman of Barclays Investment 
Bank.  Many have held prominent positions in other Russian companies, the 
Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs as well as 
leading academic posts. The Chairman of the Management Board, Igor Sechin, 
who between 2000 and 2004 was Deputy Head of the Administration of the 
President of the Russian Federation and from 2004 combined this position with 
that of Aide to the President. From 2008 to 2012 he was Deputy Chairman in the 
Russian Government.  
Under the post-2012 Presidency of Putin, the tide of state appointments to 
company boards has strengthened30. With some important exceptions, the 
presence of foreign directors is rare. Russian transnationals share many directors 
with other Russian companies.   One feature which marks them out from Western 
companies is the greater participation of directors from other sectors, especially 
29  Data here taken from Rosneft annual report for 2012 available at website. Data on ownership, p. 129.
30  On 27 January 2014, proposals were made for the return of state officials to the boards of 
RusHydro, Transneft, Rosneftegaz, Russian Grids, VTB Bank, Rosselkhozbank and Russian 
Railways (RIA Novosti 27 January 2014). 
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higher education. Vladimir Mau, for example, is on two multinational boards as 
well as being (or having been) a Rector of two Higher educational institutions. 
Others participate on the Executive Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs facilitating participation between state companies, state 
apparatuses and private companies.  Overall, the Russian transnationals are not 
just ‘state’ companies, but ‘national’ ones even under private ownership. They 
are subject to state leadership and predisposed to conform to the interests of the 
state as well as being profit making entities.  In return, their directors receive 
honours from, and social recognition by, the President.  
However, there are a number of companies which are more like Western 
companies in composition and recruitment. Such companies have more 
foreigners on their boards and many of their Russian members have been 
educated at Western business schools. They provide the basis for a more 
cosmopolitan faction of the Russian economic elite. 
Russian Cosmopolitan Transnationals
Sistema is a privately owned company ranked 385th in the Forbes list. 
It pursues neo-liberal objectives. Its vision is to build a ‘first class Russian 
company that grows long-term shareholder value.’ (p.7 of the 2016 Annual 
Report)31.  Its geographical focus is Russia and the CIS. It is a conglomerate. Its 
main subsidiaries (over 50% of ownership) are in Mobile TeleSystems, Sistema 
Shyam TeleServices, MTS Bank, RTI (technology), Detski mir (retail), Medsi 
(health care), Targin (oilfield), Bashkir power grid, Segezha group (pulp and 
paper), Leader-Invest (real estate) and Agroholding Steppe (agriculture). (pp. 
15-16). 62.4 per cent of its revenue came from MTS. (Mobile and fixed voice 
telephone, broadband, internet, pay TV and entertainment services).  
Its shareholding is dominated by the company’s founder, Vladimir Evushenkov 
who owns 64.2 per cent of the shares. Detailed biographies of the member of 
the Board of Directors are to be found in the Annual Report for 2012. There is 
a considerable overlap though, the British public figure, Mr Peter Mandelson, is 
an additional member in 2016. 
The Chairman is Vladimir Evtushenkov. A Russian graduate from the 
Moscow Mendeleev Chemical-Engineering Institute and the Economics Faculty 
of Moscow State University. In the Soviet period he worked as an engineer and 
31  http://www.sistema.com/fileadmin/user_upload/results_disclosure/2017/lse_annual_report.pdf. 
Accessed 30 April 2017
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founded Sistema in 1992. He is its principle share holder. The Deputy Chairman 
is Alexandr Goncharuk. A Ukrainian who graduated from the Sevastopol 
Higher Navy and Engineering School. He owns 1.0032 per cent of the capital. 
Brian Dickie is British with an English degree from Oxford as well as an MBA 
from Harvard Business School. He has worked in the USA, Europe and the 
Asia-Pacific Region. He is not a shareholder. 
Sistema pursues a neo-liberal agenda within the CIS. Its Annual Report 
devotes ten pages to it social responsibilities and endorses the Principles for 
Responsible Investment developed under the United Nations.  It supports 
charity and provides social support and promotes art and culture (particularly 
the Russian Museum). It also supports refugees from Ukraine.  It has very few 
direct links with the Russian government.  Sistema is an example of a Russian 
based company pursuing neo-liberal policies tempered by Corporate Social 
Responsibility. The company is not global but operates within the CIS with 
interests in Ukraine and Central Asia. The President can probably rely on the 
company for supporting a Eurasian political agenda.
X5 Retail is a retailer owning supermarkets and convenience stores. It 
comes near the bottom of the Forbes list, ranked at 1491 in 2014. There are 7 
directors32. Three are Russian, one American and three West Europeans. All 
were educated in their own countries. They collectively have 5 directorships 
of Russian companies and four of foreign ones. Herve Defforey, the Chairman 
had been managing director of Carrefour and a member of its board, he also 
had had senior positions at Chase Manhattan Bank, EBRO Agricolas and 
Nestle. Mikhail Fridman, a founder of Alfa Bank and Chairman of its Board 
of Directors, is also a Board member of the Council of Foreign Relations USA. 
There are no chinovniki on the board.
The Severstal group of companies is an integrated steel manufacturer and 
is listed on several stock exchanges. In recent years it has grown enormously 
and has two modern facilities in the USA. Its goal is to expand internationally; 
currently 35 per cent of its production from Russia is exported. The board 
reflects its international character. Of its ten board members in 2011, only five are 
Russian nationals: there are two Englishmen, one American, one German and 
one Yugoslav. Alexey Mordashov is CEO of Severstal and chairman of World 
Steel Association (Belgium); he is head of the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs, serves on the Entrepreneurs council of the Government 
of the Russian Federation and is a member of the EU-Russian Business 
cooperation council as well as the Atlantic Council President’s International 
Advisory Board.  The American member, Ronald Freeman, has (at least) six 
32 Data from Annual Report for 2012. X5 Retail Group website. Accessed January 2014
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directorships of foreign companies and two Russian ones; he is a member of 
the executive committee of the Atlantic Council. Collectively, the members 
mention 21 directorships of foreign companies and eleven Russian ones, though 
this undoubtedly is an underestimate as many ‘other companies’ are not listed. 
Two of the Russian directors, in addition to their Russian education, attended 
business schools in Britain and the United States; many also had managerial 
positions in Western firms, such as Coca Cola and Sun Interbrew. This is clearly 
a company which sees the way ahead through global exposure.
Hybrid Economic Elites in Russia
In the transformation of Russia, elites originating in the nomenklatura were 
widely considered to be key political movers33.  While the communist apparatus 
was disbanded, the networks remained. Initially, there was no class system based 
on property relations. The formation of a governing elite in Russia led to the 
development of a capitalist class. In Russia the class was nurtured by the elite, 
whereas in the United Kingdom elites have grown out of classes.  Russia is a 
hybrid system. The administrative ruling elite plays a significant role in the control 
of companies. However, it coexists with a more autonomous international business 
elite composed of Russians and foreigners, similar to the globalized boards 
identified in the UK. Bottomore’s second category is closest to the Russian case. 
But not completely – as the post-Soviet political elites created a capitalist class 
system.
Such differences in social and economic interests promote national and 
global legitimating ideologies. The more globalized corporations with foreign 
participation can be expected to support a neo-liberal economic and political 
agenda.  They provide a counterpoint to the statist leadership.  Their presence 
may also explain the neo-liberal thinking by some in the economic and political 
elites. The conflict is reflected in foreign affairs (which cannot be considered 
here). 
The current Russian ruling elite has to accommodate challenges from three 
counter-forces of interests located both domestically and abroad. First, foreign 
globalizing companies which seek to take over companies in host countries (BP 
33  Transition theory associated with writers such as Schmitter, O’Donnell, Di Palma, and Higley, 
shifted the focus to elites engaging in “compacts” and settlements, with actors “crafting” 
constitutions and institutions to a democratic design.  O’Donnell and P. C. Schmitter 1986; Higley 
and Burton, (1989): 17–32; Di Palma (1990); Higley and R. Gunther, (1992).
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is an example here). Second, Russian national globalizing companies (such as 
Lukoil) which seek a global presence. Putin is confronted by domestic globalizing 
elites seeking a place in the world order as well as foreign ones seeking the same 
result. Third, a liberal democratic intelligentsia. Elites influence rulers and their 
interests reflect their different sources of power:  moral, economic, political and 
administrative. The Russian economic elite structure is still national in form. 
Globalizing elites have less salience in Russia than in other European post-
socialist societies. Unlike other globalizing economies, Russia has the means to 
establish a form of economic national sovereignty. 
Such an alternative economic nationalism is a challenge to neo-liberalism. 
President Putin is backed by administrative control of many major companies 
as well as security organisations. Concurrently, he protects the interests of a 
Russian bourgeoisie by not threatening the legitimacy of private property.  (The 
conflict with Berezovsky over Yukos was not about the legitimacy of property 
rights but the misuse of property rights).  The Russian ruling elite structure is 
one with a growing consensus around a ruling class composed of the upper 
state bureaucracy (chinovniki) and nationally-based state and private business 
groups. Compared to the more neo-liberal economies, there is a stronger 
compatibility between the ruling political elite and the public. Hence Vladimir 
Putin’s turn to national conservatism and economic nationalism are politically 
and economically rational and rest on the class and elite structures.  As the state 
has significant ownership as well as bureaucratic control of the economy, the 
political elites can exercise considerable power over business interests. 
The Russian leadership is faced with a number of dilemmas.  To move into 
the world economy, as advocated by some business interests, would weaken the 
nation state which is the support base of national capitalists and concurrently 
strengthen neo-liberal foreign interests.  President Putin has secured limitations 
on foreign ownership (Yukos seizure is an example) making the state a major 
stake holder in many but not all Russian global companies.  However, the 
globalizing domestic economic elites – home based privately-owned globalizing 
companies (like Mechel) seek a larger global market which is facilitated by neo-
liberal policies. Currently, this group has a much weaker political and social base 
though oligarchs through their considerable wealth can influence or even veto the 
Presidential elites. They provide a source of neo-liberal opposition. Such groups 
have influence on the political elites and account for the continuation of neo-
liberal policies and attitudes. For example, the basic economic presuppositions 
of the Eurasian Union, like those of the European Union, are free mobility of 
labor, capital, goods and services.  This is in contradiction to the political claims 
of the Eurasianists for sovereignty of the nation state. It also limits state planning 
of investment and labor location.  
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President Putin has sought to reverse neo-liberal tendencies and to legitimate 
an alternative nationalist economy policy through ‘sovereign democracy’.  His 
Russian conservatism is similar in character to that of traditional Western 
national conservative parties. However, Russia (as well as China) has significant 
global or international companies whose interests would be enhanced through 
a neo-liberal policy which would facilitate entry to world markets and likely 
increased growth and higher profits. Consequently, Putin’s national ideology 
pits the ruling political elite against counter economic elites domestically as 
well as foreign neo-liberal powers.  
CONCLUSIONS
Globalization has led to the weakening of the powers of national political 
elites as nation states have lost powers to global companies and institutions. 
Countries have been differentially affected by these changes. In many, the locus 
of political power has moved away from governments and national parliaments. 
This is a consequence of three major developments.  First, the rise of global 
companies which undermine national companies and political institutions. As 
a consequence, national economic elites lose power to transnational ones and 
national parliaments become marginalised. National boundaries become porous 
because multinational agreements replace bilateral ones. Second, in globalized 
economies, political legitimation is derived from neo-liberal ideology which is 
a comprehensive doctrine imposing competitive market processes and values on 
political, social as well as economic organisations. Consequently, neo-liberalism 
as a non-territorial form of power undermines national elites. The ideology of 
neo-liberalism has legitimated the primacy of global markets which work to 
the interest of a new class configuration.  Third, nation states are eclipsed by 
the intrusion of global and regional markets. States are subject to competing 
regional and international institutions which restrict their powers of law making 
thus marginalising national political elites. National capitalist classes have been 
marginalized by the rise of global capitalist interests. The market’s ‘invisible 
hand’ does not require regulation, and the rules of global markets, when 
necessary, have been enforced through international and regional organizations. 
Transnationals have most to gain from market freedoms ensured by neo-
liberalism and they can act legitimately to further profits though market relations 
– quite independently of state governments. Transnational companies need 
states to secure rights to property and for the repatriation of profits. Study of 
the boards of companies shows that they recruit members of the political elites 
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mainly for networking and knowledge. Also the earnings of foreign subsidiaries 
of home based companies lead to a concern about the political and economic 
stability of regimes in host countries – where their assets and profits are located. 
Repatriated profits from affiliates abroad are often more important than exports 
from and sales in the home country.
Scrutiny of the boards of British transnationals showed that they have become 
socially detached from national political elites. Globalization reduces the 
effectiveness of governments towards citizens; it leads to policies which for many 
countries placate foreign financial interests. Thus national political elites not 
only lose power but also legitimacy. Profits on foreign loans benefit the financial 
company in the home country; losses leading to bankruptcy are borne by the 
governments of the host country.  The incumbent political elites have responded 
to transnational interests rather than domestic ones. Political leaders respond 
to the rise of globalizing companies and globalized states and institutions 
which favor neo-liberal solutions. National elites lose influence and national 
elite consensus is replaced by charismatic leaders. As noted by Pakulski and 
Körösényi (2011, p.3) ‘leader democracy’ is a political system in which leaders 
play ‘an increasingly central role in integrating the political elite… ’. They list as 
‘strong and popular leaders’ – Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, Bob Hawke, 
Helmut Kohl, Lech Walesa, Nelson Mandela, Gerhard Schroeder, Tony Blair, 
Junichiro Loizumi, George W. Bush, Nicolas Sarkozy and Barack Obama (p.9). 
To which we might add Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen 
who react against globalizing elites. Following this logic, political leaders then 
contrive to legitimate their policy in terms of their own national interests.  
  Globalization moves capitalism out of a nation state framework and 
neoliberalism legitimates markets to resolve conflicts of interest. Alternative 
economic policies are articulated in different political contexts, in different 
social and economic formations. The most important alternatives under 
contemporary capitalism are various forms of economic nationalism articulated 
by mainly right wing nationalist political movements in countries as different as 
the USA (Donald Trump), the UK (Theresa May’s Brexit), France (Marine Le 
Pen), Hungary (Orbán) and a form of state capitalism in China. These propose 
alternative forms of capitalism. Just which form can be adopted is a matter of 
the distribution of power within states and also the distribution of economic and 
political power between states.  Their common characteristic is an ideological 
rejection of neo-liberal policies and the articulation of policies which promote 
domestic interests, if necessary at the cost of regional and international 
allegiances. Such populist movements promise an elite circulation. 
Russia is a hybrid system, with competing economic elites based on the 
ownership of property.  Other countries have been less affected by, or have resisted 
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the consequences of, globalization. Russia is one such example being much less 
integrated into the dominant capitalist regional, economic, political and military 
blocs. Its global class interests are much weaker than in Western globalizing states. 
Political elites in Russia have greater political space to respond to, and to advocate, 
national interests. Consequently, national elites (military, economic and political) 
are more influential in the contest with globally oriented ones.  Examination of the 
boards of Russia’s major companies indicates a hybrid pattern.  There are many 
companies with a high interpenetration between the economic and political elites. 
Board members show a significant participation of government executives, such 
boards are composed of Russian born and educated members. President Putin 
not only responds to, but regulates, national capitalist interests who retain 
strategic powers in the economy.  Russia is moving towards an administratively 
coordinated state-led economy. Unlike other states locked into a globalized 
economic system, Russia has the means to establish a form of national 
capitalism. In this paper I have contended that the economic political basis of 
national capitalism is in place. The essential component of the power of the 
ruling elite is administrative control of crucial energy and financial companies. 
This is the second of Bottomore’s categories.  The Russian counter-political and 
economic elites allied to global class interests (legitimated by neo-liberalism) 
challenge the political power of elites having a national base (legitimated by 
national sovereignty).  Political leadership is a key variable in tipping the balance 
one way or another. Western political elites, in support of these counter elites in 
Russia, utilize their political, economic and media power to weaken national elites 
and to secure leaders with a neo-liberal globalizing world view. Their foreign 
policy goal is to bring all states into the neo-liberal world system.
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APPENDIX I BRITISH TOP COMPANIES
Company Rank Industry Market  Sales Profits Assets
   Value
Royal Dutch Shell   11 Oil & Gas Operations 234.1 451.4  16.4   357.5
HSBC Holdings   14 Major Banks 192.6   79.6  16.3 2671.3
BP   17 Oil & Gas Operations 148.8 379.2  23.6   305.7
Vodafone   38 Telecommunications 96.9   65.1  31.8   235.6
Rio Tinto 109 Metals & Mining 103.8   51.2    3.7   111
GlaxoSmithKline 116 Pharmaceuticals 128.8   41.4    8.5     69.7
Aviva 143 Life, Health Insurance 24.1   53.8    3.1   449.9
Barclays 160 Major Banks 64.6   55    0.8 2173.4
National Grid 168 Natural Gas Utilities 49.6   23.4    3.9     83.9
AstraZeneca 183 Pharmaceuticals 82.3   25.7    2.6     55.9
Lloyds Banking  391 Major Banks 89.9   58.6   -1.3 1402.9
Royal Bank of Scotland 424 Major Banks 59.8   38.3 -13.4 1702.4
Data in billion US$, Source: Forbes Top 2000 global companies available at: http://www.forbes.com/
global2000. The rankings here are taken from the 2014 list. http://www.forbes.com/companies/  . 
Note that data in text may be drawn from lists for other years.
APPENDIX II  RUSSIAN TOP COMPANIES
Company Industry Rank Market Sales Profits Assets
   Value
Gazprom Oil & Gas     21 88.8 164.6 39 397.2
Rosneft Oil & Gas     34 70 142.6 12.8 229.4
Sberbank Fin Serv     58 51.5   56.5  11.4 554.2
LukOil Oil & Gas     83 47.7 119.2    7.8 109.4
TNK-BP Oil & Gas   159 33   43.3    7.6   43.3
VTB Bank Fin Serv   263 14.6   22.8    2.4 262
Sistema Telecommunications   384 9.8   35.5    2.3   44.4
Rostelecom Telecommunications   907 6.8   10    0.7   16.8
Severstal Iron & Steel 1309 6.3   13.3    0.1   14.5
Inter Rao Electric Utilities 1324 2.4   20.8   -0.7   15.6
Nomos Bank Fin Serv 1443 3.1     3.4    0.4   31.9
X5 Retail Food Retail 1491 4.5   16.8    0.3     8.6
Mechel Iron & Steel 1539 0.5   11.3   -1.7   14.6
Aeroflot RIA Airline 1974 1.9    4.9    0.5     5.2
Data in billion US$;  http://www.forbes.com;  TNK-BP and Aeroflot from the 2013 list others from 
2014 list, http://www.forbes.com/companies
